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18	UNITED STATES		
19	CENTRAL DISTRIC	CT OF CALI	FORNIA
20	STEFFON BARBER, an individual,	Case No. 5:	22-cv-00625-KK-DTB
21 22	Plaintiff,	District Judg Magistrate S	ge Kenly Kiya Kato ludge David T. Bristow
23	VS.	COMPETI	NG VERDICT FORMS
24	COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO and	Final PTC:	January 8, 2026
25	CHRISTOPHER ALFRED,	Time:	10:30 a.m.
26	Defendants.	Crtrm:	3, 3rd Floor 3470 Twelfth Street
27			Riverside, CA 92501-3801
28			
-~			

TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

Dated: December 23, 2025

Pursuant to Local Rule 16-5 and this Court's Civil Trial Scheduling Order (Dkt. 47), Plaintiff Steffon Barber and Defendants, County of San Bernardino and Christopher Alfred, through their counsel of record, hereby submit these Joint Competing Verdict Forms for the January 26, 2026 trial.

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Dated: December 23, 2025 MANNING & KASS ELLROD, RAMIREZ, TRESTER LLP

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By: s/ Kayleigh A. Andersen
Eugene P. Ramirez

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Kayleigh A. Andersen

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Attorneys for Defendants, County of San Bernardino and

1213

IVIE MCNEILL WYATT

14 ||

PURCELL & DIGGS

15

By: s/Rodney S. Diggs

16

Rodney S. Diggs

17

Attorney for Plaintiff, Steffon Barber

18 19

Dated: December 23, 2025 LAW OFFICES OF DALE K. GALIPO

20

By: s/Renee V. Masongsong

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Dale K. Galipo

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Renee V. Masongsong

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Attorneys for Plaintiff, Steffon Barber

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1	PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED VERDICT FORM
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3	We, the jury in the above-entitled action, find the following:
4	
5	FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
6	
7	QUESTION 1 : Did Deputy Alfred use excessive force against Steffon Barber?
8	
9	YESNO
10	
11	If you answered "yes" to Question 1, please answer question 2. If you answered
12	"no" to Question 1, please proceed to Question 3.
13	
14	
15	<u>OUESTION 2</u> : Was the use of excessive force against Steffon Barber by Deputy
16	Alfred a cause of harm, injury, or damage to Steffon Barber?
17	
18	YESNO
19	
20	Please proceed to the next Question.
21	
22	
23	BATTERY CLAIM
24	
25	OUESTION 3: Did Deputy Alfred use unreasonable deadly force against Steffon
26	Barber?
27	
28	_?_
	?

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1	DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED VERDICT FORM
2	
3	<u>VERDICT FORM</u>
4	We, the jury, being first empaneled and sworn, do find our verdict as
5	follows:
6	
7	PHASE 1
8	ISSUE 1: Use of Force (§ 1983 Excessive Force and Battery).
9	1. Did Plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that DEPUTY
10	CHRISTOPHER ALFRED used excessive or unreasonable force against STEFFON
11	BARBER during the incident?
12	
13	YES NO
14	
15	If you answered "Yes" to this question, proceed to Question No. 2.
16	If you answered "No" to this question, proceed to Question No. 3
17	(Issue 2).
18	
19	2. By a preponderance of the evidence, was the use of excessive or
20	unreasonable force a cause of injury, damage, loss, or harm to plaintiff STEFFON
21	BARBER?
22	
23	YES NO
24	
25	Proceed to Question No. 3 (Issue 2).
26	
27	
28	
	-8- COMPETING VERDICT FORMS

1	ISSUE 2: Negligence Clam.
2	3. Did Plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
3	DEPUTY CHRISTOPHER ALFRED was negligent in his use of deadly force?
4	
5	YES NO
6	
7	If you answered "Yes" to this question, proceed to Question No. 4.
8	If you answered "No" to this question, Skip Question Nos. 4, 5, and 6,
9	and proceed to Question No. 6 (Issue 3).
10	
11	4. By a preponderance of the evidence, was DEPUTY
12	CHRISTOPHER ALFRED's negligence a substantial factor in causing harm to
13	Plaintiff STEFFON BARBER?
14	
15	YES NO
16	
17	If you answered "Yes" to this question, proceed to Question No. 5 (Issue
18	3).
19	If you answered "No" to this question, Skip Question Nos. 5 and 6, and
20	proceed to Question No. 7 (Issue 4).
21	
22	ISSUE 3: Comparative Fault.
23	5. Was STEFFON BARBER negligent in the incident events?
24	
25	YES NO
26	
27	If you answered "Yes" to this question, proceed to Question No. 6.
28	
	-9- COMPETING VERDICT FORMS

- 1		
1	If you answered "No" to this question, Skip Question No. 6, and proceed	
2	to Question No. 7.	
3		
4	6. If your answer to Question No. 5 was a "Yes," what percentage of	
5	responsibility for STEFFON BARBER'S injury, damage, loss, or harm do you assign	
6	to the negligent conduct, if any, of the following persons?	
7		
8	Plaintiff STEFFON BARBER%	
9	Defendant CHRISTOPHER ALFRED%	
10	TOTAL 100%	
11		
12	Proceed to Question No. 7 (Issue 4).	
13		
14	ISSUE 4: Bane Act (Civil Code § 52.1) Claim.	
15	7. Did Plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that	
16	DEPUTY CHRISTOPHER ALFRED acted with the particular purpose of interfering	
17	with STEFFON BARBER'S constitutional right to be free from unreasonable	
18	seizures, including unreasonable force, by threatening or committing violent acts?	
19		
20	YES NO	
21		
22	If you answered "Yes" to this question, proceed to Question No. 8.	
23	If you answered "No" to this question, Skip Question Nos. 8 and 9, and	
24	proceed to Question No. 10 (Issue 5).	
25		
26	8. Did Plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that	
27	STEFFON BARBER reasonably believed that if he exercised his right to be free from	
28		
	-10-	

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- 1	
1	11. Did DEPUTY CHRISTOPHER ALFRED act with the intention
2	of causing STEFFON BARBER extreme emotional distress?
3	
4	YES NO
5	If you answered "Yes" to this question for any defendant, proceed to Question
6	No. 12.
7	If you answered "No" to this question for all Defendants, Skip Question Nos.
8	12 and 13, and proceed to Question No. 12 (Issue 5).
9	12. Did STEFFON BARBER suffer severe emotional distress as a
10	result of the incident?
11	YES NO
12	
13	If you answered "Yes" to this question, proceed to Question No. 13.
14	If you answered "No" to this question, Skip Question No. 13, and
15	proceed to Question No. 14 (Issue 6).
16	
17	13. Was the conduct of DEPUTY CHRISTOPHER ALFRED a substantial
18	factor in causing STEFFON BARBER's severe emotional distress?
19	
20	YES NO
21	
22	
23	Proceed to Question No. 14 (Issue 6).
24	
25	ISSUE 6: Damages.
26	14. If your answer to Question Nos. 1 and 2, or Question Nos. 3 and
27	4, or Question Nos. 7, 8 and 9, or Question Nos. 10,11, 12, and 13 was "Yes," what
28	
	-12-

1	amount of damages, if any, do you find that Plaintiff sustained as a result of the actions
2	of DEPUTY CHRISTOPHER ALFRED?
3	\$
4	
5	If you awarded any amount of damages for Question No. 14, proceed to
6	Question No. 15 (Issue 7).
7	If your answers to Question No. 10 and Question Nos. 1 and 2, or
8	Question Nos. 7, 8 and 9, or Question Nos. 10, 11, 12, and 13 was "No," Skip
9	Question No. 15, answer no more questions on this Verdict Form, and have the
10	presiding juror sign and date this form in the space provided at the end.
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	-13- COMPETING VERDICT FORMS

1	ISSUE 7: PUNITIVE DAMAGES – PREDICATE.
2	15. If your answer to Question Nos. 1 and 2, or Question Nos. 7, 8
3	and 9, or Question Nos. 10, 11, 12, and 13 was "Yes," was the conduct of DEPUTY
4	CHRISTOPHER ALFRED malicious, oppressive, or in reckless disregard of
5	Plaintiff's rights?
6	
7	YES NO
8	
9	
10	
11	Please date and sign this Verdict Form in the space provided on the <u>next</u>
12	page.
13	
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	COMPETING VERDICT FORMS

1	Please date, sign, and return this Verdict Form to the Court Clerk.
2	
3	I hereby certify that this verdict is unanimous.
4	
5	Dated:, 2026
6	
7	
8	Signed:Presiding Juror (Foreperson)
9	Presiding Juror (Foreperson)
10	
11	
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	-15- COMPETING VERDICT FORMS

PHASE 2 **ISSUE 1: PUNITIVE DAMAGES – CALCULATION.** Please date and sign this Verdict Form in the space provided on the <u>next page</u>. -16-COMPETING VERDICT FORMS

1	Please date, sign, and return this Verdict Form to the Court Clerk.
2	I 1 1
3	I hereby certify that this verdict is unanimous.
4	Datad: 2026
5	Dated:, 2026
6	
7	Signed:
8	Signed: Presiding Juror (Foreperson)
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	COMPETING VERDICT FORMS

1	PHASE 3
2	
3	ISSUE 1: Monell Liability (42 § 1983) Claim
4	1. Did Defendant COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO (including its
5	SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT) violate Steffon
6	Barber's constitutional rights by maintaining an unconstitutional policy, custom, and
7	practice?
8	
9	YES NO
10	
11	Please date and sign this Verdict Form in the space provided on the <u>next page</u> .
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	COMPETING VERDICT FORMS

PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S VERDICT FORM

Plaintiff contends that in this case and in light of the revised jury instruction CACI 1305B, there should be two separate questions on the verdict form for Fourth Amendment Excessive Force and Battery.

Plaintiff objects to the inclusion of "by a preponderance of the evidence" as it appears in the prefatory language and in Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 of Defendants' proposed verdict form. It is unnecessary, as the jury will have already been separately instructed on the preponderance of the evidence standard before reviewing the verdict form.

Plaintiff also objects to inclusion of "substantial factor in causing" as it appears in Questions 4, 9, and 13 of Defendants' proposed verdict form. This is unnecessary, as the jury will have already been instructed regarding the applicability of the "substantial factor" standard to Plaintiff's state law claims.

Plaintiff objects to Question 4 of Defendants' proposed verdict form (Bane Act) for reasons explained in Plaintiff's explanation of disputes in the separately submitted Disputed Jury Instructions. Plaintiff's proposed Bane Act jury instruction accurately and clearly reflects the legal requirements for the Bane Act claim. *See Reese v. County of Sacramento*, 888 F.3d 1030, 1045 (9th Cir. 2018) ("it is not necessary for the defendants to have been 'thinking in constitutional *or legal terms* at the time of the incidents, because a reckless disregard for a person's constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.") (quoting *United States v. Reese*, 2 F. 3d 870 (9th Cir. 1993).

Likewise, Plaintiff objects to Defendants' Questions 10 and 11 regarding the IIED claim. Plaintiff's version of this question is based on language from CACI 1600: "That Defendant [Christopher Alfred] acted with reckless disregard of the

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DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' VERDICT FORM

Defendants propose that any verdict form in this case consolidate questions around issues with the same law/rule of decision – rather than having separate questions for each claim/cause of action decided by the same standard of law – so as to avoid unfair prejudice to Defendants, risk of a split-decision verdict with conflicting outcomes (multiple bites at the same apple), and to avoid juror confusion and undue consumption of time. Defendants' counsel is familiar with cases where the jury was permitted to analyze the case by cause of action, instead of by issue, resulting in an inconsistent verdict that raised an appealable issue.

Plaintiff's state law battery claim is evaluated under the same federal reasonableness standard for Fourth Amendment excessive force cases, as set forth in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). See also Hayes v. County of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 637-39 (2013) (adopting Graham reasonableness standard for seizurerelated negligence claims against officers but clarifying that scope of liability may extend to pre-seizure conduct under certain circumstances); Archibald v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171243, at *22 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2018) (acknowledging that Plaintiffs' battery, negligence, and Bane Act claims are governed by the same inquiry that governs their excessive force claims); Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. App. 4th 334, 349-50 (1996) (citing Cal. Penal Code § 196 and holding that where officers used reasonable force under the Fourth Amendment standards, there could be no liability under comparable state-law torts); Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1272-73 (1998) (holding that the standard for reasonable force under state assault/battery law is the same as it is for federal excessive force cases); Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 525 (2009) (holding that an officer is immune from any state-law claim for negligence in "preshooting conduct" and tactical decisions associated with the use of force where the use of force itself is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard); Munoz v. City

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of Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1101-03 (2004) (holding that as to a state-law battery claim, whether the force was unreasonable must be decided under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard).

Further, the California Supreme Court has held that "California's civil jury instructions specifically direct the jury, in determining whether police officers used unreasonable force for purposes of tort liability, to consider the same factors" that federal courts use for Section 1983 excessive-force claims. Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 46 Cal. 4th 501, 514 (2009) (comparing CACI 1305 with federal court's jury instruction on Section 1983 excessive-force claim). Thus, to avoid jury confusion, a single instruction should be given with regard to federal and state forcebased claims that are decided under the same standard. LePage v. Ctv. of Napa, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167275, at *22-23 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2019); cf. Estate of Casillas v. City of Fresno, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111722, at *19 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2019) (combining excessive-force instruction and battery instruction and collecting cases in support), appeal docketed, No. 19-16436 (9th Cir. filed July 22, 2019); Dubose v. Cty. of L.A., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198279, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2012) ("The Court finds that, to avoid confusion, it would be appropriate to instruct the jury that 'excessive force' for the purposes of proving a claim under § 1983 is the same as 'unreasonable force' for purposes of proving a claim for battery by a peace officer.") (citing cases); Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1412-13 (2002) ("[I]t appears unsound to distinguish between section 1983 and state law claims arising from the same alleged misconduct. . . . To avoid jury confusion and to ease judicial administration, it makes sense to require plaintiff to prove unreasonable force on both claims.").

Because the same standard and analysis for excessive force claims applies to federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as Plaintiff's state law claims for battery, if the jury finds defendants not liable for excessive force (namely, if the jury finds the force was reasonable) under one of Plaintiff's force based

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claims, it must likewise find the defendants not liable under all of Plaintiff's force based claims. Conversely, if the jury finds defendants liable for excessive/unreasonable force under one of Plaintiff's force based claims, it must likewise find the defendants liable under all of Plaintiff's force based claims.

With respect to negligence, the *Hayes* case does not create a different rule of decision on reasonableness, but merely expands the scope of actionable conduct if the deputy's pre-force tactics are *Graham*-unreasonable. *Hayes* permits an officer's pre-force tactical negligence to, in effect, render the force unreasonable only if the officer's tactical conduct negligently provokes-causes the suspect to take the action that, in turn, prompts the officer to his use of force. Hayes, 57 Cal. 4th at 623, 637-40. Significantly, however, *Hayes* also clearly holds that the reasonableness of officer conduct (both pre-force tactics and the force itself) is to be evaluated under the federal *Graham* precepts: namely, that, from the perspective of a reasonable officer, adjudged by the information known to the officer at the time of the force/tactics at issue (and not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight), an officer's conduct is reasonable if, under the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time, the force appears to be needed to overcome a threat or resistance, prevent an escape, or effect an arrest. Id. As a result, if the pre-force tactical conduct is Graham reasonable, and the force itself is Graham reasonable, the issue of whether negligent tactical conduct provoked the suspect will never be reached.

Lastly, Defendants request that the burden of proof language remain in the verdict form as it is an accurate statement of the burden. And, the language regarding "substantial factor" is also directly taken from the jury instructions, and are instructive to the jury on the appropriate standard for each question.

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